0x74 0x68 0x65 0x72 0x65 0x20 0x61 0x72 0x65 0x20 0x31 0x30 0x20 0x74 0x79 0x70 0x65 0x73 0x20 0x6f 0x66 0x20 0x70 0x65 0x6f 0x70 0x6c 0x65 0x74 0x68 0x6f 0x73 0x65 0x20 0x77 0x68 0x6f 0x20 0x75 0x6e 0x64 0x65 0x72 0x73 0x74 0x61 0x6e 0x64 0x20 0x62 0x69 0x6e 0x61 0x72 0x79 0x20 0x61 0x6e 0x64 0x20 0x74 0x68 0x6f 0x73 0x65 0x20 0x77 0x68 0x6f 0x20 0x64 0x6f 0x6e 0x74
01110100 01101000 01100101 01110010 01100101 00100000 01100001 01110010 01100101 00100000 00110001 00110000 00100000 01110100 01111001 01110000 01100101 01110011 0xdeadbeef 0xcafebabe 0x1337
0x74 0x68 0x6f 0x73 0x65 0x20 0x77 0x68 0x6f 0x20 0x75 0x6e 0x64 0x65 0x72 0x73 0x74 0x61 0x6e 0x64 0x20 0x62 0x69 0x6e 0x61 0x72 0x79 0x20 0x61 0x6e 0x64 0x20 0x74 0x68 0x6f 0x73 0x65 0x20 0x77 0x68 0x6f 0x20 0x64 0x6f 0x6e 0x74 0x74 0x68 0x65 0x72 0x65 0x20 0x61 0x72 0x65 0x20 0x31 0x30 0x20 0x74 0x79 0x70 0x65 0x73 0x20 0x6f 0x66 0x20 0x70 0x65 0x6f 0x70 0x6c 0x65
01010111 01100101 00100000 01101000 01100001 01100011 01101011 00100000 01110100 01101000 01100101 00100000 01110000 01101100 01100001 01101110 01100101 01110100 01100110 00110000 01111000 01100110 00110100 01100100 01100101

0xf4de Feed

Public curated feed for visitors

Sign in

Active view

All watched feeds

10 of 10 entries

Harmj0y2021-06-17

Certified Pre-Owned

TL;DR Active Directory Certificate Services has a lot of attack potential! Check out our whitepaper “Certified Pre-Owned: Abusing Active Directory Certificate Services” for complete details. We’re also presenting this material at Black Hat USA 2021. [EDIT 06/22/21] — We’ve updated some of the details for ESC1 and ESC2 in this post which will be shortly updated in … Certified Pre-Owned Read More »

Harmj0y2019-02-28

A Case Study in Wagging the Dog: Computer Takeover

Last month, Elad Shamir released a phenomenal, in depth post on abusing resource-based constrained delegation (RBCD) in Active Directory. One of the big points he discusses is that if the TrustedToAuthForDelegation UserAccountControl flag is not set, the S4U2self process will still work but the resulting TGS is not FORWARDABLE. This resulting service ticket will fail … A Case Study in Wagging the Dog: Computer Takeover Read More »

adidentity
Read entry
Harmj0y2019-02-20

Kerberoasting Revisited

Rubeus is a C# Kerberos abuse toolkit that started as a port of @gentilkiwi‘s Kekeo toolset and has continued to evolve since then. For more information on Rubeus, check out the “From Kekeo to Rubeus” release post, the follow up “Rubeus – Now With More Kekeo”, or the recently revamped Rubeus README.md. I’ve made several … Kerberoasting Revisited Read More »

Harmj0y2018-11-28

Not A Security Boundary: Breaking Forest Trusts

For years Microsoft has stated that the forest was the security boundary in Active Directory. For example, Microsoft’s “What Are Domains and Forests?” document (last updated in 2014) has a “Forests as Security Boundaries” section which states (emphasis added): Each forest is a single instance of the directory, the top-level Active Directory container, and a … Not A Security Boundary: Breaking Forest Trusts Read More »

Harmj0y2018-10-25

Another Word on Delegation

Every time I think I start to understand Active Directory and Kerberos, a new topic pops up to mess with my head. A few weeks ago, @elad_shamir contacted @tifkin_ and myself with some ideas about resource-based Kerberos constrained delegation. Thanks to Elad’s ideas, the great back and forth, and his awesome pull request to Rubeus, we now … Another Word on Delegation Read More »

Harmj0y2018-10-04

Rubeus – Now With More Kekeo

Rubeus, my C# port of some of features from @gentilkiwi‘s Kekeo toolset, already has a few new updates in its 1.1.0 release, and another new feature in its 1.2.0 release. This post will cover the main new features as well as any miscellaneous changes, and will dive a bit into the coolest new features- fake … Rubeus – Now With More Kekeo Read More »

Harmj0y2018-09-24

From Kekeo to Rubeus

Kekeo, the other big project from Benjamin Delpy after Mimikatz, is an awesome code base with a set of great features. As Benjamin states, it’s external to the Mimikatz codebase because, “I hate to code network related stuff ; It uses an external commercial ASN.1 library inside.“ Kekeo provides (feature list not complete): The ability to request … From Kekeo to Rubeus Read More »

Harmj0y2018-08-22

Operational Guidance for Offensive User DPAPI Abuse

I’ve spoken about DPAPI (the Data Protection Application Programming Interface) a bit before, including how KeePass uses DPAPI for its “Windows User Account” key option. I recently dove into some of the amazing work that Benjamin Delpy has done concerning DPAPI and wanted to record some operational notes on abusing DPAPI with Mimikatz. Note: I am focusing on … Operational Guidance for Offensive User DPAPI Abuse Read More »

Harmj0y2018-07-24

GhostPack

Anyone who has followed myself or my teammates at SpecterOps for a while knows that we’re fairly big fans of PowerShell. I’ve been involved in offensive PowerShell for about 4 years, @mattifestation was the founder of PowerSploit and various defensive projects, @jaredcatkinson has been writing defensive PowerShell for years, and many of my teammates (@tifkin_, … GhostPack Read More »

Harmj0y2018-07-17

The PowerView PowerUsage Series #5

This is the fifth post in my “PowerView PowerUsage” series, and follows the same Scenario/Solution/Explanation pattern as the previous entries. The original post contains a constantly updated list of the entire series. The Scenario You discovered on an engagement that most user workstations contain the user’s Active Directory samaccount name, e.g. John Smith’s ([email protected]) machine … The PowerView PowerUsage Series #5 Read More »